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Introduction
Emergency planning for vulnerable populations 
constitutes a major element of community disaster 
preparedness and is an area where guidance is 
particularly sparse (Dosa et al., 2008). Following the 
Victorian bushfires of 2009 and the north Queensland 
floods 2010-11 a number of national policy decisions 
were made that directly affected the management of 
residential aged care facilities (RACFs) in planning 
for environmental disaster threats. This includes 
new Australian Government funding requirements 
for RACFs and adoption by South Australia of a new 
fire danger rating scale. The scale now includes an 
extreme weather condition called catastrophic or  
code-red (Country Fire Service 2010a). Where a 
catastrophic fire day is predicted for the next day 
the Bureau of Meteorology will make a public 
announcement to declare a code-red for the relevant 
geographic locations. Service providers and community 
members located in the relevant bushfire prone areas 
must decide whether or not to evacuate the day before, 
or morning of, the day declared as code-red. 
Background
There is no widely accepted definition of disaster. Most 
definitions describe it as an ‘overwhelming’ disruption 
to the community. The World Association for Disaster 
and Emergency Medicine defines a disaster as: 
“an event that interrupts the  
normal functioning of a community, 
resulting in the need for external 
human and/or physical resources to 
assist in a response beyond that of 
the normal day-to-day operational 
capacity for that community”  
(TFQCDM/WADEM 2002). 
Disasters and catastrophic emergencies have the 
capacity to overwhelm emergency services making 
it difficult, at least in the short-term, to provide 
assistance to the broader community (Templeman  
and Bergin, 2008).
It is necessary for organisations, including RACFs,  
to have some capability to manage through these 
situations on their own until other services, including 
emergency services, can provide additional assistance. 
The immediate impact of disaster situations on the 
capacity of agencies external to the RACF, especially 
emergency services, to provide relief is difficult to 
assess because each disaster event presents its own 
unique set of issues related to its environment. A major 
emphasis in planning for disaster for any organisation 
is the need to understand the environment, as well  
as the potential disaster events, and to be relatively 
self-reliant when the plan is in operation  
(Templeman and Bergin, 2008).
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The aged care sector in Australia is legislated and 
funded under the Australian Government through 
the Department for Health and Ageing (Aged Care Act 
1997). The state and territory governments’ health 
departments have no jurisdiction over RACFs in their 
state or territory. This means that RACFs run the risk 
of receiving insufficient attention in state government 
emergency management plans because they are not 
part of the jurisdiction’s health structure in a formal 
and legislative sense. The Australian Government 
may issue a direction to RACFs about emergency and 
disaster response that is not in keeping with the other 
government emergency management plans. Therefore 
there is a potential for friction to develop where two 
separate jurisdictions are making policy decisions  
that affect the management of RACFs.
Discussion
In February 2009, South Australia and Victoria 
experienced a heatwave unusually excessive in 
both duration and intensity (Australian Bureau of 
Meteorology 2011). The extreme weather resulted in 
the ‘Black Saturday’ fires in Victoria, which claimed 
173 lives (Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 2009). 
As a consequence of this disaster a Royal Commission 
was established and a number of important 
recommendations were made. Two of these had 
significant consequences for RACFs. They included 
the changes to the Aged Care Accreditation Standards 
by the Australian Government for RACFs to establish 
plans for disaster events such as bushfire and flood, 
and the change to the Bureau of Meteorology Fire 
Danger Ratings to include a new category called 
Catastrophic Fire Day, code-red. 
Changes to the Aged Care 
Accreditation Standards
The Australian Government’s aged care certification 
and accreditation standards already included a 
standard requiring RACFs to have evacuation plans in 
place. The additional requirement to expand evacuation 
plans to include disaster threats brought to the fore 
a need for careful planning and review by RACF 
managers of the implications of the revised standard 
(Aged Care Standards and Accreditation Agency 2011).
Changes to Community Fire  
Danger Ratings and Education 
Department policies
The second change was an extensive re-evaluation 
of the existing South Australia community bushfire 
management system which, in light of the Victorian 
bushfires, was deemed inadequate (Taylor 2010).  
A revised process model was recommended by the 
interim report of the Royal Commission (Victorian 
Bushfires Royal Commission 2009). One of the 
modifications introduced was an increase of information 
to the public in the form of more regionally accurate 
Fire Danger Ratings (Country Fire Service 2010a).  
A catastrophic day is declared when it is considered:
• that the worst conditions for a bush or grass fire 
exists, and that
• should a fire start there is a very real likelihood 
of major loss of life and/or property (Country Fire 
Service 2010b). 
Large fires will not be defendable under these  
extreme conditions.
On these days community members in bushfire prone 
areas are advised to implement their bushfire action 
plans. Where this includes evacuation they need to 
leave their homes early and relocate to declared safe 
regional centres. The community is also advised to avoid 
unnecessary travel on roads in the regions where there 
is a catastrophic warning (Country Fire Service 2010a). 
The catastrophic fire rating recommendation was 
adopted at the state government level in South Australia 
and has led to further state policy changes. In November 
2009 the Country Fire Service and the Department of 
Education and Children’s Services in South Australia 
developed a policy for schools and pre-schools.  
These institutions would be temporarily closed and 
school buses cancelled on days of declared catastrophic 
bushfire weather conditions (Robinson 2009).
An announcement is made by the schools and 
preschools the day prior to the forecast catastrophic 
conditions, detailing those subject to closure. 
This is designed to help families make alternative 
arrangements for their children’s care. The policy to 
close schools has the potential to affect the ability of 
services and businesses in the bushfire risk areas to 
maintain effective staffing levels on these particular 
days, as most employees of RACFs are female and, 
often, carers of school-aged children.
There are essential services, such as hospitals and 
RACFs, that must be maintained in the community, 
regardless of the fire risk. Staff availability may be 
reduced on catastrophic conditions days for many of 
the semi-rural and rural hospitals and RACFs. School 
closures may mean staff need to be with their children 
and prepare their properties. Staffing of these facilities 
may be more difficult on these high fire risk rating days. 
The tensions that these policy changes placed on 
RACFs were recognised by a number of Chief Executive 
Officers (CEO) of licensed RACFs in South Australia. 
One CEO was so concerned with the potential 
implications of the policy changes that the Flinders 
University Disaster Research Centre was approached 
to run disaster management planning sessions for 
interested managers of RACFs. What ensued was 
a number of workshops at which RACF managers 
explored the key issues and analysed their planning 
needs to develop a disaster management plan. 
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Issues for Aged Care  
Service Managers 
RACFs in South Australia were not linked into the 
state government or local government emergency 
management planning processes, unless they are 
attached to a hospital service. Local governments 
are required to have a Bushfire Plan for their council 
area, but are only able to provide minimal support to 
RACFs such as advice on local risks. This is due to 
the separate legislation and funding responsibilities 
between Australian, state and local governments and 
a limitation on their available resources and ability to 
provide support in the event of a disaster. 
This lack of connectedness of RACFs to a state’s 
disaster emergency planning is important because, 
as identified from the Hurricane Katrina experience, 
where the RACFs were not part of the broader health 
service disaster plan they were not recognised 
as essential services and were not included as a 
priority area in response and recovery operations. 
Consequently, unlike hospitals, they did not receive 
adequate resources (Latika et al. 2007; Dobalian  
et al. 2010). It is important that RACFs are involved in 
state and local government disaster planning because 
it provides both the emergency planners and the 
RACFs a clear understanding of their level of access to 
emergency support and supplies. 
As RACF managers have not been part of the disaster 
planning process many were unsure about where to 
go for advice and assistance to help them meet the 
new accreditation requirements in disaster response. 
This was the first time that many of the managers 
realised that if a disaster event was to happen they 
were potentially on their own. There are no guarantees 
that the emergency services would be able to assist 
them. A number of RACF managers had, up until this 
time, vested the decision-making for event control with 
emergency services who they believed would be in a 
position to respond quickly to their needs. 
In the past, some RACF managers had undertaken a 
hazard analysis of their facility’s geographical location, 
surrounding environment, building structures, staffing 
availability and lifelines. However this was with an 
expectation that emergency support would be quickly 
available. The hazard analysis was often not linked to 
the notion that they may have to defend on their own 
and may be without support for long periods of time. 
The unpredictability of disasters makes it difficult 
for RACF managers to plan for the range of potential 
impacts and the responses that may be required. 
Better preparation entails efforts to understand 
risks and to strengthen the absorbing, buffering 
and response capacities of the facility, its staff and 
residents: in so doing, reducing the extent of damage 
and the effects of that damage on the functioning of the 
facility. The question the managers grappled with was 
‘how much preparation is sufficient?’ when the scope 
and scale of an event is unpredictable. This challenged 
RACF managers to think about a business and service 
provision continuity plan taking into account potential 
disaster events that may occur given their location and 
level of risk. In particular how long could they  
survive without water, electricity, medication and  
food supplies. 
To enable alterations to the RACFs to increase the 
absorbing, buffering and response capacity, a major 
issue was to determine the extra financial resources 
required to meet additional budget requirements. 
This was of particular concern to the smaller RACFs 
operated through charitable organisations that do not 
have ready funds for building alterations identified in 
the hazard analysis. 
In planning for a disaster event the RACF managers 
reviewed the implications for staffing levels on days 
declared code-red to determine how many staff may 
have to remain at home with their children if schools 
close, or who are unable to travel on the roads to get to 
work, or have to stay at home to defend their property 
and livestock. They also considered if extra staff were 
required during code-red days in case of a bushfire 
event and the activation of their bushfire plan.
To evacuate or not is the most difficult issue for RACF 
managers to come to grips with. The ability to evacuate 
residents and the identification of critical decision points 
in an evacuation of the facility is the issue that managers 
and staff of the facility discussed the most, because 
there is no ready-made solution. Managers expressed 
concern about their ability to make an informed 
assessment of the risk(s) in the planning and preparation 
phase, and on the day of an emergency. This risk 
assessment depends on a complex set of issues such 
as their proximity to hazards and the risk of potential 
disaster events, the structure of the facility to withstand 
the event, type and complexity of resident dependence/
needs, staff availability and training, evacuation options 
and transport access, and the availability of suitable 
accommodation for those evacuated from the area. 
Another aspect that managers explored was the 
situation that may arise during an event where the 
RACF becomes the sheltering point for people from 
the local community as well as their own staff with 
their families. These discussions highlighted the 
importance of instigating collaborative arrangements 
and establishing organisational life-lines with other 
key services in the local community. The time required 
to safely evacuate residents without causing harm to 
very frail elderly residents can take many hours for 
even the smallest of facilities. Therefore the ability to 
‘invacuate’ or shelter in place and protect residents, 
staff and others in the facility during periods of intense 
smoke and heat requires support either during or 
immediately after the fire front has passed. This 
requires inter-agency awareness and collaboration 
and appropriate notification systems to ensure that 
already overwhelmed emergency services can and do 
respond in a timely manner. 
These were the main issues that RACF managers 
grappled with during the disaster planning workshops. 
None of these issues have straightforward solutions, 
especially in the context of facilities located in areas 
where they are adjacent to identified hazards and are 
at risk of an event such as a bushfire, flood or cyclone. 
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Since the disaster workshops a number of RACF 
managers and their professional body, the Aged and 
Community Services (South Australia and Northern 
Territory), lobbied the state government for inclusion 
in state disaster planning. A working-party was 
established to undertake a bushfire risk assessment 
of over 40 RACFs across South Australia funded by the 
South Australian Department of Health. These RACFs 
have been provided with a report and defensibility 
rating of their infrastructure.
Conclusion
This paper discusses how the changes to policy 
regarding emergency management planning made by 
one jurisdiction (a state government) can impact on 
RACFs, licensed by another jurisdiction, the Australian 
Government. The policy and operational decisions 
made at the Australian Government level have been 
made without fully examining the practical implications, 
particularly for RACF managers. While many of the 
facilities on which these decisions impact understand 
the rationale for such decisions, it is argued that 
these decisions have serious implications for services 
and residents. Privately-operated RACFs have not 
historically been involved in any state or local government 
emergency management planning. The whole concept of 
risk assessment, preparation and planning to increase 
the absorbing, buffering and response capacity of their 
facilities, against extreme weather events, has become, 
for some, an overwhelming and resource intensive task. 
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